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A growing body of research points to the fact that capital markets react to
environmental news and thus create incentives for pollution control in both
developed and emerging market economies.  In this paper we conduct an event
study to examine the impact of environmental rating of large pulp and paper, auto
and chlor alkali firms on their stock prices.  We find that the market generally
penalizes environmentally un-friendly behaviour in that announcement of weak
environmental performance by firms leads to negative abnormal returns of up to 43
percent.  A positive correlation is found between abnormal returns to a firm’s stock
and the level of its environmental performance.  These findings should be viewed as
further evidence of the important role that capital markets could play in
environmental management, particularly in developing countries where
environmental monitoring and enforcement are weak.
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1.  Introduction
A growing body of research points to the fact that capital markets in developed
market economies react to environmental news and thus create incentives for
pollution control
1.  An important policy implication of this literature is that regulatory
effort can be leveraged by the release of information regarding firms’ environmental
performance to markets.  This aspect becomes particularly important in the context
of developing countries where monitoring and enforcement capabilities are limited
(Dasgupta et al., 2001).
Further, if the forgoing view about capital markets is valid they may be viewed
as yet another pressure point in pollution abatement by firms—in addition to the
pressure by regulatory agencies (either through command and control (CAC) or
through market-based instruments or MBIs) and by communities
2.  Again, this is an
important consideration for developing countries that face difficulties in implementing
either CAC or MBIs based solutions.
Finally, in the context of increasing emphasis on voluntary programmes to
improve environmental quality, if firms perceive this link (between their stock prices
and their environmental track record) this creates another incentive for them to
participate in voluntary environmental programmes (Alberini and Segerson, 2002).
In this paper we conduct an event study to examine the impact of
environmental performance of large pulp and paper, automobile and chlor alkali firms
in India on their stock prices.  Our finding, namely, that the dissemination of
knowledge about weak environmental performance of companies tends to lower the
return to investors holding the stocks of such companies is important in light of the
preceding statements.  In sum, it lends credence to the view that even in emerging
market economies such as India capital markets can: (i) leverage monitoring and
enforcement activities, (ii) acts as an additional environmental pressure point on
firms, and (iii) create incentives for participation in voluntary environmental
programmes.
The following section describes how environmental performance is measured
for the firms in our sample and compares this with a similar recent study for
developing countries.  In section III we describe the methodology and dataset.
                                                          
1.  See for instance Lanoie et al. (1998) and the references therein.
2.  On the role of communities see Afsah et al. (1996), Blackman and Bannister (1998) and Pargal
and Wheeler (1996).2
Section IV presents results.  The final section discusses directions for further
research and concludes.
2.  Measuring environmental performance of firms in India
In this study we use the environmental rating by India’s leading environmental NGO,
the Delhi-based Centre for Science and Environment (CSE).  Under its Green Rating
Project (GRP), CSE evaluates the environmental performance for various industrial
sectors.  This project has been funded by the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP) through the central Ministry of Environment and Forests
(MoEF).  So far, CSE has rated firms/plants in pulp and paper, automobile
manufacturing and chemicals (chlor alkali) sectors.  There are plans to rate
additional sectors and also to re-evaluate sectors that have already been rated such
as pulp and paper (see www.cseindia.org/html/eyou/grp/grp_index.htm for details).
Thirty one large pulp and paper plants (capacity of 100 tons per day or more)
representing 23 firms across 13 states were the first to be rated (Appendix 2-A).  The
exercise took about 18 months and the ratings were released on July 18, 1999.  This
was followed by a rating of 29 automobile manufacturers that was released on
October 29, 2001 (Appendix 2-B).  Finally, 25 chlor alkali firms comprising about 90
percent of the caustic-chlorine sector were evaluated and the ratings were released
on September 2, 2002 (Appendix 2-C).  As we note below in the description of our
dataset, the release of these environmental ratings are high profile and prominent
events that are widely reported in the media.
While credit rating agencies exist in India, the GRP is the first attempt at
environmental rating of firms in the country
3.  In the absence of a comprehensive
reporting system such as the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) in the United States,
the GRP relies heavily on voluntary disclosure of information by firms.  This
information is acquired by CSE through structured surveys and fieldwork and is
reviewed and vetted by technical experts
4.  A life cycle analysis (LCA) beginning
from raw material procurement to product recycling, is used to study the
environmental impact of a firm.  To elaborate, environmental impacts at the following
                                                                                                                                                                                    
3.  “The uniqueness of GRP is that this is the first time anywhere in the developing world that the environmental
performance rating of industrial firms is being undertaken by an NGO and that information of the environmental
performance of companies is being made available to the public.”  (CSE website, accessed 2.3.2003).
4.  For further details see http://www.cseindia.org/html/eyou/grp/grp_rating_method.htm3
stages of the life cycle are analysed: (a) during sourcing of raw materials, (b) during
production, that is, processing of raw material into final products, (c) during product
use, and (d) during disposal of the products.  This approach is operationalised
through the following six broad criteria and their components:
1.  Sourcing and processing raw materials
2.  Plant level environmental performance
(i)  input management
(ii)  process management
(iii)  waste management
3.  Product-use performance
4.  Product-disposal performance
5.  Corporate environmental policy and management systems
(i)  corporate policy related to environment
(ii)  procurement policy and supply chain management
(iii)  status of corporate environmental management and environment
       management systems (EMS)
(iv)  research and development
(v)  health and safety
(vi)  transparency
6.  Community and regulatory perception and compliance status
(i)  compliance with pollution control board (PCB) regulations and perception
     of PCB officials
(ii)  perceptions of local community
(iii)  perceptions of local NGOs and media
(iv)  perception of CSE’s green inspector
It should be noted, however, that the weights assigned to various criteria vary
substantially across the three sectors based on their inherent characterises.  For
instance, in the case of pulp and paper firms, maximum weight was given to
procurement of raw material and production phases, whereas for automobile firms
highest weight was assigned to the product use phase.  This reflects the implicit
assumption that environmental impacts of different sectors occur at different stages4
of the life cycle.  As we see later, this may have implications for the findings of our
study.
Table 1 summarises the weights used by the CSE for the computation of
environmental scores based on which green ratings are given.  Some more details
regarding the weights assigned to various criteria for rating pulp and paper and
automobile firms are shown in Appendix 1-A and 1-B, respectively.  While the rating
categories across the two sectors are not identical, nevertheless there are some
striking differences in the weights assigned.  First, while plant-level performance
(particularly process management) is assigned considerable weight for pulp and
paper (50) the corresponding weight for automobiles is 11.5.  Secondly, product use
and disposal have been assigned zero weight for pulp and paper but 61 for
automobiles.
Table 1: Weights assigned for computation of green rating by the CSE
Segment Weights
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-  production phase
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Source: Centre for Science and Environment (CSE), New Delhi.
It is also important to note that the Green Rating Project benchmarks environmental
performance against ‘theoretical best practice” for the various components/criteria.
In other words, companies/plants/products are not rated against current
environmental norms, standards or regulations but against an ideal best practice.  In
fact, full compliance with current environmental regulations merely fetches a score of
2 on a 10 point scale.5
Specifically, the green rating uses the following scores on a 10 point scale for each
component/criterion: Indian average/standard/legal requirement 2, global best
practice 8, theoretical best practice 10.  In other words, wherever a domestic source-
specific discharge standard exists it is taken as the lowest benchmark (2 points).  In
case there is no such standard as in the case of SO2 emissions, the average
discharge for all plants in the sample is taken as the lowest benchmark and below
average performance is given zero, the best performance gets 8 and there is a liner
scale between 2 and 8
5.  The points given to global best practice and theoretical best
practice reflect an incentive for better environmental performance.  It is, therefore,
important to bear in mind that the rating emphasises overcompliance with current
standards or practices.  This point is particularly relevant when we interpret the
results of our study.  In other words, what is the nature of the ‘event’ that capital
markets are reacting to?
The final rating is a “green leaves” award ranging from no award to five
leaves
6.  While such ratings are subject to the usual index number problem, we
believe they are a consistent and careful evaluation of firm-level environmental
performance.  Similar exercises entailing public disclosure of firms’ environmental
performance have been carried out in a few other developing countries such as
Indonesia’s PROPER programme, in the Philippines under the Ecowatch
programme, and in China under the Green Watch programme
7.  There are, however,
very few studies for developing market economies that examine the impact of such
environmental performance on capital markets.  Notable among these is a recent
exercise by Dasgupta, Laplante and Mamingi (2001) that shows capital markets in
Argentina, Chile, Mexico and Philippines react to both positive and negative
environmental news.  In that study for each of the four countries, environmental
news on firms traded in local capital markets was collected over a four year period
(1990-1994) from one leading daily newspaper.  This news (or ‘event’) was classified
as positive (e.g., rewards, investment in pollution control) and negative (e.g., spills,
                                                          
5.  For paper and pulp the linear scale ranged from 2 through 10 but was later capped at 8 for
automobiles and chlor alkali.
6.  The cutoff scores for each level are 5 leaves (75-100), 4 leaves (50-74.9), 3 leaves (35-49.9), 2
leaves (25-34.9), 1 leaf (15-24.9), and no award for < 15.
7.  For details on the disclosure programmes in Indonesia and the Philippines see World Bank (1999)
and for that in China see Wang et al. (2002).  The impact of Indonesia’s PROPER on environmental
quality is examined by Afsah and Vincent (1997).6
complaints and warnings).  Total ‘events’ during this period ranged from 18
(Philippines) to 53 (Chile) covering 10 firms each in Philippines and Mexico, 11 in
Argentina and 17 in Chile.  On the whole, with respect to positive news there was a
statistically significant increase in market values for 20 events out of 39.  For
negative news the corresponding figure was 33 events out of 85.
In contrast, our study uses a standardised one-shot event, namely, the
announcement of green ratings and leaf awards on July 18, 1999 for pulp and paper
firms, October 29, 2001 for automobile firms and September 2, 2002 for firms in the
chlor alkali sector.  This has the advantage that it rules out possible selection bias of
only ‘newsworthy’ (very good/bad) events being reported.  And it is the same event
across all firms.  Further, in our study we only consider one event per firm, whereas
Dasgupta et al. (2001) consider multiple bad (and good) ‘events’ for various firms.
For instance, in Philippines for San Miguel (a brewing company) positive news was
reported three times within a span of ten months (Table V, op. cit.).  Only one of
these three ‘events’ resulted in a statistically significant increase in market value.  In
such instances of repeated positive (or negative) news for the same firm it is
possible that investors may be discounting such news.  Finally, unlike classification
of events simply as positive or negative, the environmental rating we use provides a
complete ordering of firms (see Appendix Tables 2-A, 2-B and 2-C).  In sum, we
believe that we are able to bring to data a more objective and consistent measure of
firm-level environmental performance for a developing country than has been done
so far.
In this context, it may be mentioned that India’s stock market capitalisation is
about US$ 300 billion (April 2000) – the highest among emerging market economies.
Further, the industrial sectors rated by CSE so far are experiencing rapid growth or
occupy an important position on the Indian industrial scene
8.  Paper and pulp and
caustic soda are also among the 17 “highly polluting” industrial sectors as identified
                                                          
8.  The chlor alkali industry forms the backbone of the chemicals sector in the country.  In recent
years all three segments of this industry (caustic soda, soda ash and chlorine) have experienced
generally positive though sluggish growth in output, except chlorine that has recorded double-digit
growth.  Caustic soda, a basic inorganic chemical, is primarily used for the manufacture of paper,
detergents, aluminium, viscose and other products.  Chlorine is a by-product, and for every ton of
caustic soda manufactured, 0.8 tons of chlorine is produced.  In the automobile sector, 2 and 3
wheelers make up the largest segment in terms of numbers and have registered growth rates in
double digits.  The 4 wheeler segment shows slower though steady growth, as does the pulp and
paper sector.7
by the Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB) for implementation of pollution control
programs (http://cpcb.nic.in/17cat/17cat.html).  In other words, these two sectors are
among those that appear to be the focus of environmental regulatory attention and
are regularly highlighted in the annual reports of CPCB and on its website.  Most
state pollution control boards (SPCBs) also take their cue from CPCB in focusing on
these sectors.  The same is the case with automobile firms where the environmental
performance of their products, namely, motor vehicles has been the subject of
intense judicial and regulatory activity in India in recent years.
3.  Framework, methodology and data
In an efficient capital market, stock prices on any day fully reflect available
information about the present value of the stream of profits that a firm is expected to
earn in the future (Fama, 1991). The provision of new information about the
environmental performance of a firm may cause abnormal changes in its stock price,
if this information diverges from the investors’ expectations about such performance
and is perceived by them to affect the profitability of the firm.  This is the theoretical
framework that underlies the event study methodology, applied by Khanna et al.
(1998), Arora (2001), Dasgupta et al. (2001) as well as other researchers to examine
the reaction of capital market to environmental news.
It is generally believed that in developing countries capital markets are not as
efficient as in developed countries and are therefore not expected to respond to new
environmental information about firms in the same way.  As discussed earlier,
however, Dasgupta et al. (2001) show that capital markets in developing countries
do respond to environmental news.  Accordingly, we conduct an event study to
assess the impact of the announcement of environmental rating of large pulp and
paper, auto and chlor alkali plants in India on the stock prices of the firms to which
they belong.  Our aim is to investigate whether the capital market in India responded
significantly to the announcement of the ratings of plants belonging to these
industries and the nature of this response.
Event study methodology
There are alternative models for carrying out an event study (MacKinlay, 1997).  One
of them is the market model.  Khanna et al. (1998), Arora (2001) and several other8
event studies have used the market model
9 (see MacKinlay (op. cit.) on the
advantages of the market model).  In this study we use the market model as well.
The market model assumes a linear relationship between the return of any
security and the return of the market portfolio:
it mt i i it e R R + + = β α …(1)
with  () 0 = it e E and  ()
2
i e it e Var σ =
where t is the time index and i = 1, …, N represents securities.  Rit and Rmt are the
return on security i and the market portfolio, respectively, during period t, and eit is
the random error term associated with security i.
For estimation of the model, first the event window is defined.  This could be
just one day after the event, or more than one day after the event.  Sometimes, days
prior the event are also included in the event window.  Equation (1) is typically
estimated over a period of 120 to 210 days prior to the event window.  The
commonly used estimation method for the market model is Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS).  Given the estimates of α  and β  for each firm, the abnormal return for firm i in
period t (say, day t) in the event window is defined as:
mt i i it it R R AR β α ˆ ˆ − − = …(2)
The abnormal return is the disturbance term of the market model calculated on an
out of sample basis.  Under the null hypothesis, conditional on the event window
market returns, the abnormal returns will be jointly normally distributed with a zero
conditional mean and conditional variance σ
2(Rit) (MacKinlay, 1997).  If the period
used for the estimation of the model is large, σ
2 (Rit) →  
2
i e σ .
To test for the persistence of the impact of the event during a period T1 to T2
(in the event window) the abnormal returns of a given security can be added to
                                                          
9.  Dasgupta et al. (2001) have applied the constant mean return model as they did not have data on
market returns.  Where they could find data on market returns, they also obtained results using the
market model.9
obtain cumulative abnormal returns.  Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for security i
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The variance is given by:
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Given the CAR and its variance, the null hypothesis of zero cumulative returns can
be tested by applying a z-test, because CARi (T1 , T2 ) ~ N(0, σ i
2(T1 , T2 )).
These cumulative returns can also be aggregated across the N scripts and average
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and, the variance of CAAR is:
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Under the null hypothesis that the abnormal returns are zero,
()








Z = ~   N(0,1) …(7)
Thus, a z-test can be carried out to test for the statistical significance of average
cumulative abnormal return across the N scripts.  It should be pointed out here that
the distributional result in (7) above is asymptotic with respect to the number of
scripts and the period of estimation (MacKinlay, 1997).10
Data
We use data on stock prices for 17 pulp and paper firms, 15 auto firms and 18 chlor
alkali firms for this study.  These are firms whose plants were included in the Green
Rating Project of CSE.  As mentioned earlier, environmental ratings for pulp and
paper industry were announced by CSE on July 18
th 1999, those for automobile
firms were announced on October 29
th 2001, and for chlor alkali firms the ratings
were declared recently on September 2
nd 2002. The announcements of
environmental ratings are high profile events with prominent persons such as the
former Indian Finance Minister releasing the scores and distributing the ‘leaf’ awards.
These events are accompanied by extensive media coverage.
To carry out the analysis, closing stock prices (adjusted for splits, bonuses,
etc.) for the selected companies for 120 trading days prior to the announce of the
rating and 30 trading days after the announcement have been taken from the
corporate database PROWESS of Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy
(CMIE)
10.  Since the market model is used, data on market returns are also needed.
To this end, we use the popular Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) “Sensex”
11.
The event window has been defined as 15 trading days following the
announcement of the green rating of plants.  Days prior to the event have not been
included in the event window, unlike Dasgupta et al. (2001), since there are no
compelling reasons to believe that the market could have anticipated the ratings to
be given by CSE under its Green Rating Project.
The market model has been estimated with data for 120 trading days prior to
the event.  In two paper firms, the estimated β  turned out to be negative when data
for  120  trading  days  were  used.  For these two companies, a shorter period within
                                                          
10.  This  database  contains  financial  data  on  over 8,000 Indian firms from 1988-89 and is
regularly  updated.  These are firms that are  registered  under the  Companies  Act and are typically
large  and  medium  firms  and  account  for  more than  seventy  per  cent  of the  economic  activity
in  the  organised  industrial  sector  of  India.  The data is primarily gathered from profit and loss
statements and balance sheets of companies as well as other secondary sources.  See
http://www.cmie.com/products/prowess/index.htm for details.
11.  Of 22 stock exchanges in India, the Bombay Stock Exchange is the largest, with over 7,500
stocks listed and accounts for over two thirds of total trading volume in the country.  Established in
1875, the exchange is also the oldest in Asia.  Approximately 70,000 deals are executed on a daily
basis, giving it one of the highest per hour rates of trading in the world.  There are about 3,500
companies in the country that are listed and have a significant trading volume.  The market
capitalization of BSE is 5 trillion rupees (Rs. 49 = US$ 1).  The BSE Sensex is a widely used market
index.  It is a value-weighted index comprising 30 companies (base April 1979 = 100).  The set of
companies in the index is essentially fixed and account for approximately one-fifth of the market
capitalization of BSE.11
the 120 trading days has been used.  The estimation period for these two companies
was chosen by repeated trials, till the estimate of β  became positive and the t-ratio
for the regression coefficient was found to be more than one.
As stated earlier, CSE examined 28 units in the pulp and paper sector, 29 in
automobiles and 25 in chlor alkali, with the rating ranging from five leaves (best) to
one leaf, or even no leaf for the worst performance/non cooperation.  In no case,
was a four or five-leaf rating awarded—as noted earlier, firms/plants/products in the
sample were not rated against current environmental norms, standards or
regulations but against ideal best practice benchmarks.  In fact, as already stated full
compliance with current environmental regulations merely fetches a score of 2 on a
10 point scale.  Thus, it seems unlikely that in the near future at least any firm/unit
would get a 4 or 5 leaves award.
The companies chosen for the study are those who own one or more of the
plants included in the rating exercise. For some of the plants, share prices of
companies owning them were not available.  These plants have therefore been
excluded from the analysis.
Table 2 shows the distribution of the selected companies according to the
ratings of the plants owned by them. Generally, there is a one-to-one
correspondence between the plants rated and the companies selected for the study.
But there are cases where a company had more than one plant rated.  For instance,
one pulp and paper company (Ballarpur Industries Ltd. – BILT) had three plants
rated ‘two leaves’ and two plants rated ‘one leaf’.  Since this company had the
majority of its plants in the ‘two leaves’ category, the overall rating of the company
has been taken as ‘two leaves’.  Similarly, one company belonging the chlor alkali
sample had one plant in the ‘three leaves’ category and two plants rated as ‘two
leaves’.  Thus, the overall rating of the company has been taken as two leaves.12
Table 2: Distribution of Companies according to the rating of their unit/plants
Rating Industries
Pulp and paper Automobiles Chlor alkali
One leaf 8 4 4
Two leaves 7 8 8
Three leaves 2 2 5
No rating given - 1* 1*
Total companies 17 15 18
* For plants belonging to these companies, no rating is given.  However, their rank
and scores indicate that they are at the bottom in terms of environmental
performance.
4.  Results
Table 3 shows the average abnormal return for the day following the announcement
(event) and average cumulative abnormal returns (CAAR) for five, ten and fifteen
days after the event, for the three industrial sectors.  The average abnormal return
for the 17 pulp and paper firms taken together on the first day after the
announcement of green ratings is negative but not statistically significant.  That is not
the case, however, for event windows longer than a day.  Thus, cumulative abnormal
returns averaged across the 17 firms (CAAR) are negative and statistically significant
for the five trading days period (0-5), the ten trading days period (0-10) and the
fifteen trading days period (0-15). For the 15-days period following the
announcement, the cumulative abnormal return is –0.27 on average, which is
statistically significant at the two per cent level.  This may be interpreted as showing
an average loss of about 27 percent in stock value (over and above the changes in
the market portfolio) caused by the announcement of green ratings.
It seems the announcement of green rating gave the impression to investors
and the public that the environmental performance of pulp and paper mills in India
was not up to the mark.  Though some plants were rated better than others even
their performance was much below global standards (and of course, theoretical best
practice).  No pulp and paper mill was given a rating of five or four leaves, and most
were given a rating of ‘one leaf’ or ‘two leaves’.  The market seems to have taken
this news as an adverse indication of the environmental performance of firms.13
Table 3: Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAAR): Pulp and Paper,
Automobile and Chlor Alkali Firms in India
Number of days
0-1 0-5 0-10 0-15
Pulp and Paper firms
Average cumulative
abnormal return
-0.0229 -0.1050 -0.1912 -0.2707




0.0115 0.0529 0.0869 0.1305




-0.0077 -0.0078 -0.0433 -0.0865
z-ratio -0.5777 -0.2606 -1.0209 -1.6651




-0.0152 -0.0550 -0.1152 -0.1760
z-ratio -0.9895 -1.6069 -2.3784 -2.9674
Somewhat similar results are obtained for the chlor alkali firms.  The average
abnormal return for day 0-1 and average cumulative abnormal return for days 0-5, 0-
10 and 0-15 are negative for chlor alkali firms, as in the case of pulp and paper.
These, however, are not statistically significant, except the CAAR for the fifteen
trading day period (statistically significant at 10 per cent level).  Also, the negative
abnormal return in chlor alkali firms is smaller than that for pulp and paper firms.
This is perhaps expected since the proportion of companies awarded two or three
leafs is relatively greater among chlor alkali firms compared to pulp and paper (Table
2).
Turning now to automobile firms, the results obtained are sharply at variance
with those obtained for pulp and paper and chlor alkali firms.  Here the average
abnormal return for day 0-1 and average cumulative abnormal return for trading days
0-5, 0-10 and 0-15 are positive.  Also, the cumulative abnormal returns for days 0-5,
0-10 and 0-15 are statistically significant.14
The finding of positive abnormal return for auto firms could be due to some
peculiarities of the industry and/or in the manner of rating.  With regard to the latter,
as noted earlier, the emphasis in the rating for this sector is on the product per se
and not on the production process.  Hence, the market may be discounting the
mediocre ratings performance by firms in this sector as not being a true reflection of
their environmental performance
12.  It is also possible given CSE’s long running
campaign against automobile companies and vehicular pollution, the market
expected the worst from the green rating and was in fact pleasantly surprised when
the ratings were not so harsh.  In other words, better than expected performance
could be viewed as positive performance news (with positive abnormal returns).
It should also be pointed out that the announcement of the green rating for
this sector came at a time when the stock market was recovering rapidly from a large
fall in stock prices it had experienced for nine-months or so.  Between January and
September 2001, the BSE Sensex fell from about 4500 to 2500 (Figure 1).  Since
October 2001, the stock market made a smart recovery and by December of that
year, the index had recovered to about 3500.  Since the announcement of green
rating of auto firms was done at the end of October, there was a strong bullish phase
in stock prices during the event period.  This may have made it difficult for the simple
statistical method applied to separate the effect of announcement of green rating by
CSE from the effect of other forces working on stock prices of auto companies.  This
issue has been noted in the event study literature.  For instance, Henderson (1990)
observes, “If the type of event under study has a greater probability of occurring in a
bull market than a bear market, it creates a problem.  If expected residuals are
based on an estimation interval where the market was not doing well, the conditional
expectation of Rjt is misspecified , and that misspecification is introduced into the
excess return calculation” (p. 294).  Similarly, McWilliams and Siegel (1997) note
that abnormal returns associated with an event can only be truly identified if, inter
alia, (1) markets are efficient, (2) the event was unanticipated, and most critically (3)
there were no confounding effects during the event window.
                                                          
12.  This observation goes to the heart of the question—even if we observe the impact of poor
environmental performance on stock prices what is the reason for this causality to hold?  Does it
reflect possible future liability or simply increased pressure from civil society?  As of now there is no
theory for this causality.15
It is also interesting to note that though the average of abnormal returns for auto
firms as a whole is positive, for some important companies, the abnormal returns for
day 0-1 and  0-5 turn out to be negative, for example Hindustan Motors and Tata
Engineering and Locomotives.
Since the results for automobile firms may have been affected by the bullish
phase of the stock market at the time of announcement of the green rating and/or by
some other factors, the rest of our analysis is based only on estimates for pulp and
paper and chlor alkali firms.  Thus, the bottom half of Tables 3 and 4 shows average
abnormal returns combining only these two sectors, and distinguishing between one-
leaf firms and those with more than one-leaf.  The average abnormal return for day
0-1 and average cumulative abnormal return for days 0-5, 0-10 and 0-15 are all
negative.  Moreover, the averages for days 0-10 and 0-15 are statistically significant.
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Table 4:  Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns: Pulp and Paper,
and Chlor Alkali Firms
Number of days
0-1 0-5 0-10 0-15
Pulp and Paper
Firms with one leaf
rating
-0.0556 -0.1398 -0.3049 -0.4281
Firms with two-leaves
rating or better
0.0060 -0.0740 -0.0901 -0.1307
Chlor alkali
Firms with one leaf
rating
-0.0079 -0.0384 -0.1056 -0.1788
Firms with two-leaves
rating or better
-0.0074 0.0010 -0.0225 -0.0568
Pulp and Paper and
Chlor alkali




-0.0397 -0.1060 -0.2385 -0.3451






-0.0019 -0.0297 -0.0502 -0.0871
z-ratio -0.1659 -1.1582 -1.3838 -1.9600
Comparing firms that were rated ‘one leaf’ with those that received two or three
leaves, it is found that the average cumulative abnormal return for the ‘one-leaf’
companies is much more negative than that for the ‘two leaf’ and ‘three leaf’ groups.
For the 0-15 days period, for example, the average cumulative abnormal return for
pulp for paper firms was      –0.43 for the ‘one leaf’ firms as against  –0.13 for those
that received more than one leaf.  Similarly, in the case of chlor alkali firms, the
average cumulative abnormal return for the    0-15 days period was –0.18 for
companies awarded one leaf as against –0.06 for companies awarded two or three
leaves.  Combining the pulp and paper firms with the chlor alkali firms, the average17
cumulative abnormal return for the 0-15 days period was –0.35 for companies
awarded one leaf, statistically significant at five percent level.  The corresponding
figure for companies awarded two or three leaves was –0.09, also statistically
significant at five percent level.
The main point that emerges from Tables 3 and 4 is that the capital market
seems to have penalised pulp and paper firms and chlor alkali firms for poor
environmental performance, especially those whose performance was relatively
worse.  This is corroborated by Figure 2 that shows (for pulp and paper and chlor
alkali firms combined) average cumulative abnormal return for different lengths of
time up to 15 days following the announcement of green ratings.
It is interesting to note that while the average cumulative abnormal return for the
‘two-three-leaves’ category stabilised after seven days, that for the ‘one-leaf’
category continued to fall.
Figure 3 presents a comparison of average cumulative abnormal return
across three groups of firms on the basis of the score/ranking given by CSE--firms
have been classified into three groups: the top one-third, the next one-third and the
bottom one-third in terms of environmental performance.  Cumulative returns for
days 0-1, 0-5, 0-10 and 0-15 are shown in the graph.  It is evident from the graph



















































that the average cumulative abnormal return is negative for all three groups (except
for the top ranking group for day 0-1).  Further, the return is the worst for firms that
received the lowest score/ranking.
It should be pointed out here that in the sample of pulp and paper and chlor alkali
firms combined (and also independently for the two groups) there is a significant
positive correlation between the estimated abnormal return and the environmental
score.  The correlation coefficient between estimated abnormal return on the first day
after the announcement and the weighted score is 0.54 (see Figure 4 for the plot).
This is statistically significant at the one per cent level.  The correlation coefficients
for abnormal returns for days 0-5, 0-10 and 0-15 are 0.35, 0.43 and 0.36,
respectively.  All of these are statistically significant at five per cent or higher level.
The finding of a significant positive correlation between environmental score and
abnormal return as one would expect provides basis for confidence in the estimates










rank in environmental performance
Average cumulative abnormal return (Pulp and 







To our knowledge, this is the first attempt to examine the impact of public disclosure
of environmental performance on the financial performance of firms for a developing
economy.  In future work it would be useful to examine if these findings are robust
across sectors and over time.  With respect to methodology, alternatives to the
market model such as CAPM and the multifactor model (Tawil 1999) could be
employed, again to test the robustness of the results.  More important, however, in a
developing country context where market adjustment is slow is the application of
diffusion theory to test how markets adjust to ‘events’ (Boardman et al. 1997).
These are issues for further research.
Our findings further strengthen the emerging view that capital markets bolster
regulatory efforts in both developed and developing market economies.  Specifically,
a perception of weak environmental performance by dirty industries is penalized by
negative abnormal returns.  This result is not driven by disparate ‘events’ as in an
earlier study but by a comprehensive and consistent green rating.  Thus, an
important policy implication of the research would be institutionalising such public
disclosure programmes as a tool for environmental management in developing
countries.
Environmental score and abnormal return (Pulp and 
Paper and Chlor alkali firms)
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Appendix 1-A: Weights for rating of pulp and paper firms
Weight
Corporate environmental policy and management systems
(i)  corporate environmental policy (7)
(ii)  corporate policy on procurement of raw materials, water, energy and chemicals (3)
(iii)  corporate policy on waste management, technology adoption, and community
relations and communications (2)
(iv)  status of corporate environmental management (19.5)
(v) transparency  (2)
(vi) awards  (1.5)
35
Plant-level environmental performance
(i) input  management  (8)
(ii)  process management (including recycling and reuse of resources and wastes (31)
(iii) waste  management  (11)
50
Product use performance 0
Product disposal performance 0
Community and regulatory perception and compliance status
(i)  compliance with pollution control board (PCB) regulations and perception of PCB
         officials (2.5)
(ii)  perception of local community (7.5)
(iii)  perception of local NGOs and media (2.5)
(iv)  perception CSE’s green inspector (2.5)
15
Total 100
Source: “Enter the Green Rating Project”, Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi
1999.23
Appendix 1-B: Weights for rating of automobile firms
Weight
Environmental performance of supply chain 7.5
Environmental performance of production plant
(i)  consumption efficiency (1.5)
(ii)  process management and process efficiency (4)
(iii)  pollution generation and pollution prevention and control (2.5)
(iv)  compliance status at production plant (0.5)
(v)  perception of CSE’s green inspector (3)
11.5
Environmental impact during product use
(i)  vehicle and engine design (34.5)
of which
(a)  geometric design of the engine (10.5)
(b)  fuel supply technology of the vehicle (6)
(c)  displacement per cylinder (3)
(d) compression  ratio  (3)
(ii)         pollution control equipment (12)
(iii)        emissions and noise pollution from vehicles (9.5)
56
End-of-life disposal/recycling of product 5
Corporate environmental policy and management systems 20
Total 100
Source: “Green Rating Project: Environmental Rating of Indian Automobile Sector,” Centre
for Science and Environment 2001.24








1 JK Paper Mills 90,000 42.75 1 3
2 Andhra Pradesh Paper Mills 98,500 38.50 2 3
3 Sinar Mas Pulp & Paper (India) 115,000 37.40 #
4 BILT-Ballarpur Unit 150,000 33.44 3 2
5 Hindustan Newsprint 100,000 33.30 4 2
6 SIV Industries 60,000 31.73 5 2
7 Pudumjee Pulp & Paper Mills 33,000 31.44 6 2
8 Tamil Nadu Newsprint & Papers 180,000 31.40 7 2
9 ITC-Bhadrachalam Paperboards 62,500 31.15 8 2
10 Century Pulp & Paper 151,920 31.07 9 2
11 HPCL-Nagaon Paper Mills 100,000 28.70 10 2
12 Seshasayee Paper & Boards 60,000 28.20 11 2
13 West Coast Paper Mills 119,750 27.67 12 2
14 BILT-Asthi Unit 35,000 27.10 13 2
15 BILT-Yamunanagar Unit 70,000 25.70 14 2
16 Central Pulp Mills 45,000 25.35 15 2
17 Star Paper Mills 53,000 24.76 16 1
18 Shree Vindhya Paper Mills 33,000 24.70 17 1
19 BILT-Sewa Unit 30,000 23.75 18 1
20 Orient Paper Mills 85,000 22.10 19 1
21 Mysore Paper Mills 130,000 21.60 20 1
22 Cachar Paper Mills 100,000 21.43 21 1
23 Rama Newsprint & Papers 61,380 21.10 22 1
24 BILT-Chaudwar Unit 20,000 21.06 23 1
25 Nath Pulp & Paper Mills 41,750 20.80 24 1
26 Grasim Industries (Mavoor) 57,600 20.65 25 1
27 Mukerian Papers 34,650 20.01 26 1
28 Amrit Papers 26,400 19.01 27 1
# Sinar Mas was operational only since 1996-97 and therefore it was not included in the rankings.
Source: The Green Rating Project, Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi.25
Appendix 2-B: Ratings of automobile firms
Name Weighted score Rank Rating
(no. of leaves)
1 Daewoo Motors India Ltd. 43.54 1 3
2 Hyundai Motors India Ltd. 41.93 2 3
3 General Motors India 40.78 3 3
4 Mercedes-Benz India Limited 39.63 4 3
5 Hero Honda Motors Ltd. 39.57 5 3
6 Maruti Udyog Ltd. 39.14 6 3
7 Honda-Siel 38.23 7 3
8 Ford India Ltd. 37.62 8 3
9 Fiat India 35.67 9 3
10 Volvo India Pvt. Ltd. 34.60 10 2
11 Bajaj Auto Ltd. 32.84 11 2
12 Tata Engg.& Loco.Ltd. 32.03 12 2
13 Hindustan Motors Ltd. 31.11 13 2
14 TVS Suzuki Ltd. 30.86 14 2
15 LML Limited 29.36 15 2
16 Toyota Kirloskar Motors 28.13 16 2
17 Scooters India Ltd. 27.84 17 2
18 Kinetic Motor Company Ltd. 27.44 18 2
19 HM-Mitsubishi Lancer 27.38 19 2
20 Ashok Leyland Ltd. 26.41 20 2
21 Eicher Motors Ltd. 25.07 21 2
22 Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. 24.15 22 1
23 Royal Enfield Motors 23.22 23 1
24 Majestic Auto Ltd. 20.52 24 1
25 Hero Puch 20.26 25 1
26 Kinetic Engineering Ltd. 15.82 26 1
27 Bajaj Tempo Ltd. 0.00 27 -
28 Yamaha Motors Escorts Ltd. 0.00 27 -
29 Swaraj Mazda Ltd. 0.00 27 -
Source: The Green Rating Project, Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi.26






1 Chemfab Alkalis Ltd. 46.6 1 3
2 Shriram Alkalis & Chemicals Ltd 45.3 2 3
3 Indian Rayon & Industries Ltd. 38.8 3 3
4 Indian Petrochemicals Corporation Ltd. 38.6 4 3
5 Search Chem Industries Ltd. 36.2 5 3
6 Sree Rayalseems Alkalis & Allied Chemicals Ltd. 35.4 6 3
7 TamilNadu Petroproducts Ltd. 35 7 3
8 Gujarat Alkalis & Chemicals Ltd. – Vadodra 33 8 2
9 Grasim Industries Ltd. 30.4 9 2
10 BILT Chemicals 30.36 10 2
11 Century Rayon Ltd. 29.6 11 2
12 Gujarat Alkalis & Chemicals Ltd. – Dahej 28.9 12 2
13 Shriram Chemicals & Fertilizers Ltd. 28.7 13 2
14 DCW Ltd. 28.2 14 2
15 SIEL Ltd. 27.4 15 2
16 Bihar Caustic and Chemicals Ltd. 25.4 16 2
17 Kanoria Chemicals Ltd. 24.8 17 1
18 Standard Industries Ltd. 24.2 18 1
19
Hukumchand Jute & Industries Ltd. (HJI - GMMCO) 21.7 19 1
20 NRC Ltd. - Chemical Division 20.3 20 1
21 Punjab Alkalis & Chemicals Ltd. 19.9 21 1
22 Travancore Cochin Chemicals Ltd. 15.1 22 1
23 Andhra Sugars – Kovvur 0.0 23 -
24 Andhra Sugars – Saggonda 0.0 23 -
25 Chemplast Sanmar Ltd. 0.0 23 -
   Source: The Green Rating Project, Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi.
*  Complete list of Working Papers is available at the CDE Web site:
    http://www.cdedse.org/worklist.pdf